Transition to Full Authoritarianism Through the Performance of Change Politics

Uganda is sliding from managed democracy into open authoritarianism as electoral manipulation, institutional capture and elite capitulation deepen, stripping voters of even the minimal power once preserved through the performance of competitive politics.

That President Yoweri Museveni has, over the past four decades, favoured authoritarianism over democracy is not in serious dispute. His early engineering of a one-party system after taking power, alongside the deaths of alleged early opponents such as Andrew Kayiira, point to a leader who was laying the foundations for authoritarian rule from the outset.

Yet Museveni has also consistently invested in the performance of democracy. He has measured public sentiment through parliamentary and local government elections, allowed his strongest opponents to run against him in presidential contests, and preferred gerrymandering constituencies or manipulating processes rather than outright rigging to reward loyalists. This duality has long defined his rule.

Barring exceptional circumstances, Museveni has largely appointed ministers who won elections and were therefore presumed popular, while dropping many who lost. Since the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, he has only appointed vice presidents with identifiable core constituencies, demonstrated through their ability to win parliamentary seats without serious contest.

As he has aged, however, some of his surrogates have increasingly tied electoral manipulation aimed at securing their individual victories to Museveni’s continued hold on power. Without meaningful pushback from civil society and the media, Ugandans risk losing the ability to choose their leaders even at parliamentary and local government levels.

Previously, civil society and the media enjoyed a limited but functional operating space. While presidential elections were heavily compromised, rigging was less blatant for other positions.

Opposition actors could still approach courts, secure favourable rulings, and maintain operational licenses. Today, that space has narrowed dramatically, with the judiciary increasingly appearing to rewrite sections of the Constitution in service of authoritarian consolidation.

The 2026 election cycle uniquely illustrated this deepening authoritarianism. Several government agencies demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to disenfranchise voters, a trend that aligns with a broader global shift.

Authoritarianism is no longer treated as taboo. Models from Rwanda, China, and West Asian monarchies increasingly present autocracy as both viable and capable of delivering economic stability.

At the same time, the West’s moral authority to promote democracy has weakened. Its support for Israel’s war in Gaza, suppression of dissent, circumvention of international law, and sanctions against institutions such as the International Criminal Court have eroded its credibility. Ugandan elites have undoubtedly taken note.

Museveni and his inner circle have also observed the capitulation of domestic elites, particularly within opposition parties, civil society, and the media. A clear illustration emerged in the run-up to the 2026 general election when the Electoral Commission deleted three duly registered women from the voters’ register over their intention to contest the Bukedea District Woman Member of Parliament seat.

Civil society offered only token solidarity to the lone candidate aligned with the opposition. Political parties largely failed to respond. One party attempted to field a candidate, but without the national backing required to counter the power of Speaker of Parliament and incumbent Bukedea Woman MP Anita Among, no qualified contender was willing to take the risk.

After repeated attempts to find a replacement candidate, a senior politician from the People’s Front for Freedom remarked that it was difficult to “liberate women from fellow women,” noting that capable candidates feared retribution for challenging the Speaker.

The National Unity Platform eventually identified Florence Asio as its replacement candidate, but she disappeared on nomination day, leaving Speaker Among to emerge unopposed. This outcome followed the deletion of independent candidate Hellen Odeke Akol, Susan Norma Otai of the Forum for Democratic Change, and NUP’s Mercy Alupo from the electoral register.

This pattern was not unprecedented. In 2021, several women were similarly disqualified. Some, like Merab Amongin, ended up imprisoned over dubious charges, while Odeke Akol spent years in fruitless litigation.

Her case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, where justices ruled that nullifying the Bukedea election would unfairly affect Speaker Among, who was not party to the proceedings, despite lower courts finding the registrar’s actions illegal.

The losses experienced by women candidates in Bukedea during the 2021 and 2026 elections required a broad coalition to provide financial support, legal backing, and political solidarity. National coordination could have countered the deepening authoritarianism and voter disenfranchisement. Instead, change-seeking forces largely stood aside.

As protection of powerful National Resistance Movement figures became normalized, the Electoral Commission escalated its campaign of blocking and disqualifying candidates nationwide. In Ruhinda North, Deputy Speaker Thomas Tayebwa emerged unopposed after his opponent reported being blocked from nomination.

Similar incidents occurred in Kakumiro, where Prime Minister Robinah Nabbanja is the incumbent Woman MP.

By election day, more than three dozen candidates had been disqualified. In Isingiro North, incumbent MP Bright Rwamirama eliminated all four opponents before polling day. In Budiope East, Moses Magoogo’s challengers faced a similar fate. In Makindye, a record 11 mayoral candidates were disqualified.

This impunity has since extended into the post–January 15 declaration phase, with hotspots such as Sembabule, Kampala, and Gomba witnessing violence and alleged ballot stuffing.

Observers point to the judiciary’s failure to act as a neutral arbiter, raising fears that national elections will increasingly resemble NRM internal primaries, where violence and manipulation are routine.

What is striking is the muted public reaction. In 1980, similar state-backed efforts to engineer unopposed candidates for the Uganda People’s Congress and block Democratic Party contenders triggered a guerrilla war that brought Museveni to power. Forty-five years later, comparable tactics are being deployed with little organized resistance.

The phenomenon has also devastated the elections economy for lawyers and governance activists, yet no collective action has emerged beyond isolated lamentations. No coalition of lawyers, political parties, or civil society actors has mobilized to defend candidates blocked, disqualified, or rigged out.

Ironically, Museveni once harnessed public anger over electoral injustices to fuel his rebellion. Today, political actors laugh off rigging when it affects NRM-leaning candidates, revealing the erosion of principle in Uganda’s political space.

Purity politics within the opposition, reluctance to organize collectively, and heavy reliance on NGOs that dominate civil society have produced widespread lethargy. NGOs, fearful of losing licenses, avoid controversy. As one NGO employee bluntly put it, “We provide protection, but not for politicians.”

Organizations that claim to nurture women in politics declined to intervene in Bukedea, citing fear of confronting the Speaker. Others avoided challenging institutions like the Electoral Commission and the Presidency, which appeared invested in blocking competition.

This may be the true genius of the new crop of NRM power brokers. In the past, Museveni allowed just enough democratic space to reset legitimacy. That space is now disappearing.

Over the lifespan of the 1995 Constitution, Parliament has had an exceptionally high attrition rate. In the 11th Parliament, only 107 of 457 MPs returned, representing a 77 percent turnover.

In some cases, Cabinet created special constituencies to shield senior officials from electoral defeat. Even then, voters occasionally defied the system, as seen with Evelyn Anite.

After leading the charge that ousted Amama Mbabazi in 2014, Anite was rewarded with a newly created Koboko Municipality seat. She won it, only to lose five years later despite championing the removal of the presidential age limit. Raphael Magyezi, who moved the age-limit amendment, also faced voter backlash and declined to seek re-election.

These examples demonstrate that voters once retained minimal power to punish incumbents. That power is now at risk of disappearing as incumbents increasingly choose manipulation over persuasion, transforming democratic offices into hereditary fiefdoms.